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Abstract
This paper provides an interpretation of the global pattern of economic growth
in the period following 1950. It uses a model in which growth in an individual
country depends on a number of different so-called common trends that are
representative of the global economy. Although such trends are common (i.e.,
shared between countries), the model allows for a differential impact of each
trend in each separate country. The general inspiration for this approach lies
in the debate on globalization, in which it has been argued that countries are
getting more and more integrated, i.e., share more and more common features
that determine their growth performance.
The results indicate that a model with just three common trends provides
an adequate representation of global growth. But rather than leading to con-
vergence of living standards, these common trends lead to divergence, because
there are large differences between countries in terms of the local impact of the
common trends. Sopecifically, it is found that divergence of living standards
is driven by very long-run differences in growth rates between countries, rather
than by specific episodes of catching-up in a limited time span that is more
limited than the full 1950-2006 period.
1 Introduction
Globalization is a highly controversial economic trend. Some argue that it brings
prosperity to the world, providing an opportunity for relatively poor countries
to catch up with the richer part of the world. Others argue that globalization
provides unequal opportunities, mainly benefitting those that are already in-
cluded in the top-level of the global economic hierarchy. The debate is clouded
not only by the mixing of ideology and scholarship, but also by a lack of a clear
definition of the notion of globalization, and by the inadequacy of economic
growth models, which do not seem to be able to really address globalization as
a theoretical phenomenon.
The aim of this paper is to have a fresh look at the evidence about eco-
nomic growth, in light of some ideas about the impact of globalization on global
economic growth. The paper does not present new theory, no matter how use-
ful that could be. Instead, it proposes a new empirical methodology that can
be used to describe and broadly interpret the global growth pattern(s), thus
providing a sense of direction fior future work in the area.
Globalization is usually defined as increased economic interaction between
the nations of the world, facilitated by technological advances that lower the
costs of transportation and communication, and by institutional change, such
as the lowering of barriers to trade and capital movements. This is not a new
process, it is generally acknowledged that the seeds of globalization can be traced
back at least a century, to the late 19th century, when global trade and capital
movements flourished (e.g., Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004). With the outburst of
the first World War in 1914, globalization was on the decline, as the interna-
tional system of fixed exchange rates based on the gold standard collapsed. The
Great Depression of the 1930s added to the decline of globalization, when many
countries retreated in protectionist measures.
The period after the second World War is generally seen as one in which
globalization is on the rise again. But until 1973, this was based on an economic
world order (the so-called Bretton Woods system) in which international capital
movements were strongly regulated, and hence limited (Obstfeld and Taylor,
2004). Despite this, technological spillovers led to a strong convergence of living
standards in at least a part of the world (e.g., Abramovitz, 1979). Indeed,
technological innovations such as cheaper air travel and telecommunications
were among the main drivers of this process of globalization and convergence
(Nelson and Wright, 1992).
With the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, globaliza-
tion attained a new face, in which the free international flow of capital became
an important mantra. While the logic of the Bretton Woods system of fixed ex-
change rates (with most currencies around the world pegged to the US$, which
in turn was subject to the gold standard) did not allow free international capital
movements, the new economic world order put capital movements centre stage.
Among the benefits of international capital movements that are presented in the
textbooks are the ability to smooth consumption (by international borrowing
and lending), the ability for investments to seek out the most productive oppor-
tunities, and the technology spillovers that come with foreign direct investment
(FDI) (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004).
What does all this this imply for global economic growth and the distribu-
tion of wealth around the globe? The optimistic globalization scenario is that
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with increased economic interaction between nations, living standards around
the world will converge as knowledge becomes universally accessible as a result
of spillovers related to trade and investment flows. While the theoretical mech-
anisms behind such a scenario are multifold and complicated to test, the mere
hypothesis of convergence is much easier to analyze empirically, and in fact has
been subject of a large literature already. The pessimistic globalization scenario
is that globalization will lead to divergence of living standards, as a result of
unequal access to knowledge implied by the setup of the global economic order.
Again, the causal factors underlying such an hypothesis are complex, beyond
the scope the analysis here, and difficult to test empirically, but the prediction
in terms of divergence is easy to analyze.
The topic of convergence or divergence of living standards (GDP per capita)
has already received much attention. It has been addressed by different types of
methodologies, e.g., regression models (e.g., Verspagen, 1991, Barro and Sala-
i-Martin, 1991), the estimation of distributions of living standards by means
of kernel density techniques and Markov transition dynamics (Quah, 1996), re-
gression trees (Durlauf and Johnson, 1995), and historical analysis (Abramovitz,
1979). This paper adds a new methodology to this list: the estimation and inter-
pretation of common trends in economic growth patterns. This methodology is
much inspired by the idea of globalization, as it emerged in the field of business
cycles research, where it was used to test the hypothesis that globalization has
led to a synchronization of the business cycle as a result of increased interaction.
The basic idea behind the methodology is that growth in an individual nation
can be explained at least partly by one or more global or semi-global trends in
growth. One possible form of this hypothesis is the idea of a single global steady-
state growth rate, as it was put, for example in the neo-classical growth models
of the 1950s (e.g., Solow, 1956). While the methodological model specifies one
or more of such global trends (which do necessarily need to be steady states,
however), it also allows such global trends to have different impacts in different
countries (which is, of course, different from the Solow prediction, and much
more in line with the idea of conditional convergence as in, e.g., Barro and Sala-
i-Martin, 1991). Thus, there may be a set of countries that are very "integrated"
to each other in which the global trend(s) explain a large fraction of national
growth, and there may be a different group of countries in which the global
trend(s) explain much less, and a domestic idiosyncratic part of the growth
trend plays a larger role.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section starts with a
short and formal description of the methodology. The most important element
of this is the econometric model that specifies the dynamics of the common
factors in economic growth, and their impact on individual countries. Section
3 looks at the empirical evidence on global economic growth. It starts with a
brief review of the empirical trends, after which the econometric model is aplied.
This takes the form of a "narrative" about economic growth. The narratrive is
a story about how the three common trends that are identified are related to
individual country’s growth paths, and how they influence the trends in global
convergence and divergence of living standards. The paper concludes with a
brief discussion of the implications of the empirical findings, including the issue
of how globalization relates to economic growth.
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2 Methodology
2.1 Estimating common trends
The methodology for estimating common trends in global economic growth is
based on Zuur et al. (2003). Let yt denote a vector of GDP per capita values,
where the elements of the vector correspond to observations for different coun-
tries. Although the methodology allows for exogenous explanatory variables,
these are not included in the current application. I.e., in the current approach,
yt is modeled purely as a data generation process, without a specific economic
theoretical interpretation of the causal links underlying economic growth. The
time series process that generates the observations for yt is as follows:
yt = γΛt + μ+ εt
Λt = Λt−1 + ηt
Λt is a vector of so-called common factors (or common trends). They are
called common trends because each of the country-wise elements of the GDP
per capita vector yt depends on them, as a linear combination with coefficient
matrix γ. With the number of countries equal to N and the number of com-
mon trends equal to M (¿ N), γ is an NxM matrix, with time-independent
elements. In an analogy to factor analysis, the elements of y are referred to
as factor loadings. The common trends Λt themselves are random walks, as ηt
is a normally distributed disturbance term with zero mean and fixed positive
variance. εt is also a random variable, again with assumed zero mean and fixed
positive variance. Finally, μ is a vector of time-invariant level effects, which
correspond to the mean of the time series for individual countries.
The estimation procedure, which is described in detail in Zuur et al. (2003),
estimates the parameter vector γ, and the common trends Λt (as well as var-
ious variances). The number of common trends M is pre-determined in the
estimations (values M = 1..4 are tried).
2.2 Convergence and divergence
As GDP per capita (yt) is expressed in natural logs, the standard deviation over
countries within a given year is an approximation for the average percentual
deviation from the mean value in the sample (without taking logs, one would
have to calculate the coefficient of variation, i.e., the standard deviation divided
by the mean, to obtain the average percentual deviation). As the percentual
deviation is, in principle, not sensitive for changes in the mean over time, this
is generally used as an indicator of convergence (a falling standard deviation)
or divergence (rising standard deviation).
If it is assumed that the covariance of the country-specific residual in the
estimations with the deviation of the country-specific predicted value and the
average predicted value is zero, the standard deviation of the predicted values
is an unbiased and efficient estimator of the actual standard deviation in the
sample.
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3 Global economic growth
3.1 An empirical overview
The data used in this paper is taken from the website of Angus Maddison,
and covers the period 1950 - 2006 for 129 countries that together cover the
large majority of world population. Although for some countries data go back
further in time than 1950, global coverage is only available from 1950 onwards.
The dataset covers GDP per capita, with GDP expressed in purchasing power
parities (see Maddison, 2007 for more details on the data). Figure 1 displays
the kernel density estimation for the distribution of ln(GDP per capita).1 As is
well-known from Quah (1996), initially (1950s), the distribution was essentially
single-peaked. The peak corresponds to a large number of countries at relatively
low levels of GDP per capita. Gradually, a second peak begins to emerge at
the high-income side of the distribution, indicating a number of countries at
intermediate income levels that are growing more rapidly than the rest. At
the end of the period, the distribution is clearly multi-peaked. Arguably, three
















































Figure 1: The global distribution of living standards
1All analysis in the paper is conducted for unweighted data, i.e., countries of different size
are weighted equally. Weighting by population would obviously make a difference, especially
for the later periods, when growth in several large countries is high (e.g., China, India).
However, as we do not have any specific theoretical priors on the relationship between country
size and growth, using unweighted data is more appropriate.
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The multi-peaked nature of the distribution also implies that the distribution
has become flatter, i.e., the standard deviation has become larger. It has already
been noted that the standard deviation of the distribution can be seen as a
measure of convergence or divergence. Figure 2 displays the standard deviation
of GDP per capita for the same global dataset. Clearly, the indicator goes up
for the entire period, with only a brief interruption in the 1980s, when the trend
is essentially flat. Thus, in line with Figure 1, Figure 2 suggests that divergence
is the rule in the global economy after the Second World War. However, as is
well-known from previous work in the area, convergence is observed for a smaller
group of countries. This is indicated for the trend in Figure 2 for the European
countries and the so-called Western offshoots (this is Maddison’s terminology,
referring to the USA, Canada, Australia and new Zealand). For this group of
countries, the standard deviation of GDP per capita is already at a low level
(around 0.5) in 1950, and keeps falling over the entire period. Outside this
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Figure 2: Convergence and divergence in the global economy (broad groups)
Figure 3 displays the same indicator for subgroups of countries outside Eu-
rope and the Western offshoots. The groups are based on a geographical crite-
rion, broadly covering continents (Asia, Latin America, Africa) or subcontinents
(Middle East). In each of those groups of countries, except the Middle East,
divergence is the rule, as the standard deviation is rising over time. Conver-
gence in the Middle East seems mostly associated with the availability of oil
resources, and halts from the mid-1980s onwards. Outside the Middle East,
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only in Asia from the early 1990s onwards do we see a flat trend. Thus, it seems
to be the case that a major task of the econometric model that will be applied
below is to account for global divergence of living standards, while still allowing
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Latin America Asia Middle East Africa
Figure 3: Convergence and divergence in the global economy (outside Europe
and Western offshoots)
3.2 A narrative of three growth paths
The econometric model explained above was estimated for the complete dataset
of 129 countries and 57 years. This means that it was assumed that there are a
number of common trends Λ for this complete period, with the loading matrix
γ constant over time.2 Models with 1..4 trends were estimated, from which the
version with 3 trends was chosen for presentation. Zuur et al. (2003) suggest
to use an information criterion like AIC or BIC for the selection of the number
of trends. In the present case, BIC suggests 3 trends, while AIC suggests 4 (or
more) trends. However, the main reason to present the model with 4 trends is
the average predictive power of this model, relative to a model with a different
number of trends. This is documented in the appendix, where it is it is concluded
2Another approach would have been to split the period up and estimate separate trends
for each subperiod. Because the number of countries is large relative to the number of years,
this approach was not adopted (as it would imply a large number of parameters γ compared
to the number of observations).
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that the model with 3 trends provides the best overall approximation of global
growth patterns.
Figure 4 provides a graphical representation of the three common trends.3
The first of these trends, which is labeled "steady state" in the graph, corre-
sponds to a more or less fixed exponential growth rate over the complete period
(remember that y is specified in natural logs, so that a linear trend in the graph
actually corresponds to exponential growth). A slight decline in slope (i.e., the
exponential growth rate) is observed after 1980 (roughly), but this is not a very
strong effect. Overall, this first trend clearly represents the idea of a steady state
growth rate. However, because the individual countries have different values for
the loading coefficient γ (something that will be illustrated in detail below), this
steady state trend is actually highly country specific. Depending on how large
the differences in the loading coefficients between countries will be, the steady
state growth trend presents a large potential for divergence (as observed in Fig-
ure 2 and 3), because it points to a growth rate differential that accumulates
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Figure 4: The 3 estimated common trends of global economic growth, 1950 -
2006
The other two trends are not monotonically increasing over time.4 The first
of these, labeled "early catch up" in the graph, shows a steep linear incline
roughly until the early 1970s. This corresponds to the Bretton Woods period,
and is associated with rapid growth in a broad set of countries during this
3The estimation results also contain stanedard errors for the estimated trends. These are
very small and therefore not documented.
4 It must be kept in mind that the loading coefficients γ can be negative, in which case the
effect of the trend reverses relative to the inclination in the figure.
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period (this is investigated closer when the loading coefficients γ are discussed).
After the early 1970s, this trends shows first a more or less linear decline, and
afterwards it flattens off, possibly leading to a new turning point outside the
window of observation. The last trend ("late catching-up") show an almost
inverted pattern. It first has a flat segment, roughly until the mid-1960s, after
which it declines until the mid-1980s. From this point onwards, this trend is
firmly upward, indicating a late phase of catching-up for the countries that load
high and positive on this trend.
Although the trends are common across countries, the loading matrix γ
determines the actual "impact" of the trend on a country’s growth path. It
is therefore important to look at the distribution of the loading coefficients
γ. Figure 5 provides the kernel density estimation for the loading coefficients
associated with the first trend (the "steady state"). The figure distinguishes
between the country groups that have been used before. It shows that there
are clear geographical differences in the distribution of the loading coefficients.
The highest modal value is observed for Europe and Western offshoots. The
distribution for this group is also relatively (compared to the other groups)
narrow, i.e., the variation within this group is small. It is this narrow shape of
the distribution that explains the tendency for convergence in this group that
was observed in Figure 2. Also, the relatively high value for the loadings of
this trend in Europe and Western offshoots point to a long-run growth rate
advantage of these countries over the rest of the sample, which is an important
factor behind the global divergence trends that were observed above. The slope
of the "steady state" trend is ≈ 0.23, and the median value of the loading
coefficient in the Europe and Western offshoots group is ≈ 0.12, which yields
a contribution of the "steady state" trend to growth in this group of countries
≈ 2.8%.
Africa shows the lowest modal value for the loadings associated with the
"steady state", although the African distribution appears to be multi-peaked,
with a small peak to the right (at approximately the value of the peak for
Europe and Western offshoots). The median value of the loading coefficients
on the "steady state" trend in Africa is ≈ 0.04, which implies a "steady state"
contribution of ≈ 1% growth per year. Compared to Europe and Western
offshoots, this puts Africa at a backlog of 1.8% growth per year, only as the
result of a difference in the contribution of the "steady state" trend.
Latin America shows an intermediate value for the loadings. Its median
loading implies a a backlog of 1.5% growth per year compared to Europe and
Western offshoots. The distributions for Asia and the Middle East are very
wide and flat, indicating that there is a relatively large amount of variation
in the loadings for these country groups. There is again some evidence for a
multi-peaked distribution for Asia, with the right-most peak at a very high load-
ing value (above 0.2), higher than any value observed for Europe and Western
offshoots. Countries associated with this right-most peak in the Asian distribu-
tion are Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. These are the
countries that are usually referred to as the "Asian Tigers", for their remarkable
growth performance in the postwar period. The estimation results suggest that
an important explanation for this remarkable growth performance is the contri-
bution of the "steady state" trend, i.e., a sustained growth rate differential over
the entire period.













Figure 5: Kernel density estimations for the loading coefficients associated with
the first trend ("steady state")
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and Western offshoots stretch into the negative domain. This implies that there
are a number of countries that show a negative "steady state" trend growth
rate.
The mean values for the distributions for the loading coefficients associated
with the other two trends are much lower, as is clear from the following two
figures. For the second trend ("early catching-up", Figure 6), the observed
loading coefficient vary roughly between -0.05 and 0.05, with the exception of
some countries in the Middle East, which show higher values. This implies that
the contribution of the "early catching-up" trend is generally low. Interestingly,
the Asian distribution shows a peak for a slightly negative loading value. This
is surprising because it suggests that the "early catching-up trend" does not
contribute to high Asian growth in the period before the 1970s. In fact, this
holds true for the "Asian Tigers", as they are generally characterized by negative
loadings on the "early catching-up" trend. On the other hand, the negative
loadings for many Asian countries, compared to other countries with positive
loadings, imply a positive effect on growth after the early 1970s, when the "early














Figure 6: Kernel density estimations for the loading coefficients associated with
the second trend ("early catching-up")
Finally, the distributions for the last trend ("late catching-up", Figure 7) are
also in the narrow range -0.05 - 0.05. All modal values are observed at values
very close to zero, which seems to make this a truly "neutral" trend in the broad
cross-country domain. The distribution for Europe andWestern offshoots is very
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narrow (around zero), while that for other country groups is broader. Referring
back to the "Asian Tigers", these countries are usually (again) on the negative
side of the Asian distribution, which means that from the mid-1960s to the
mid-1980s, they have a (relatively) positive influence from this trend. Other
Asian countries that are experiencing fast growth more recently, like China,












Figure 7: Kernel density estimations for the loading coefficients associated with
the third trend ("late catching-up")
The particular loading patterns that are observed at the country level or the
country group level lead to rather smooth growth patterns, in which the strong
non-monotonicity of the two last trends are not immediately recognized. This
is shown in Figure 8, which uses the median values of loading coefficients within
the country groups to construct "representative" trends. These representative
trends also include the average levels of GDP per capita within the country
groups, which, as indicated above, the empirical model treats as exogenous
shift factors. The figure shows a decline in the growth rate after the mid-1970s
for most of the country groups, except for Asia. In Asia, the combination of
the three trends produces a smooth steady state growth path that shows no
major slowdown after 1970 (but which is, however, subject to relatively large
within-group variation).
To illustrate how the separate growth trends combine at the level of an indi-
vidual country, Figure 9 shows the predicted trend growth paths for four indi-















Figure 8: Predicted growth paths using median values of the trend loadings for
country groups
moderate growth until the mid-1970s, and stagnate afterwards. The stronger
initial growth performance of Brazil is associated to a higher loading on the
first trend ("steady state"): ≈ 0.1 for Brazil vs. ≈ 0.05 for Argentina. The two
Latin-American countries show similar loadings on the second trend (≈ 0.01),
but they diverge again on the last trend (≈ 0.05 for Argentina, ≈ −0.1 for
Brazil). China and South Korea both load much higher on the first trend
(≈ 0.24 for South Korea, ≈ 0.16 for China), which, as observed before, gives
them a strong "basis" for rapid growth over the complete period. They also
both load negative on the second trend (≈ −0.02), but diverge from each other
on the third trend (≈ 0.02 for China, ≈ −0.005 for South Korea).
In the final part of the review of the quantitative results, the attention turns
to convergence and divergence again. How well do the predicted values from the
three-trends model fit the convergence and divergence trends that were observed
in Figure 2 and 3? This is explored in the final three figures. These show how
the standard deviation of the fitted values from the three-trends model tracks
the actual standard deviation of per capita GDP levels in the sample reasonably
well. Following the observation that the "steady state" trend seems to be rather
important for long-run growth rate differentials, the figures also include a line
that presents the fitted values on the basis of this trend only. Thus, the lines in
the graphs that are labeled "steady state" represent standard deviations of the
GDP per capita values that are fitted using the "steady state" trend only.
Figure 10 shows the results for the complete sample of 129 countries. The











1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
South Korea China Argentina Brazil
Figure 9: Predicted growth paths using the trend loadings for Argentina, Brazil,
China and South Korea
the figures) is rather tight until 1970, after which the standard deviation of the
fitted values begins to under-estimate the actual level of divergence a bit. This
is reversed in the 1980s, when the actual level of the standard deviation falls
below the fitted one. The pattern is again reversed in the early 1990s, and again
in the early 2000s. But all these deviations between the fitted and actual level
of divergence are small.
Looking at the standard deviation of the "steady state"-only predictions,
these show a consistently lower standard deviation than the fitted values based
on the full set of three trends. Thus, it can be concluded that the "steady
state" growth rate differentials do not account for all heterogeneity observed in
the sample. The two non-monotonic trends contribute positively to observed
heterogeneity. Still, the "steady state" predictions account for the largest part of
the increase in heterogeneity of living standards, i.e., for the observed divergence
in the total sample. The observed increase in the standard deviation from 1950
to 2006 is approximately 0.3, as is the increase in the standard deviation of the
"steady state" predictions.
The results for Europe and the Western offshoots are presented in Figure 11.
This fit is also tight, although convergence is slightly under-estimated during
the 1970s, and a short spike of divergence in the 1980s is not tracked. From
the 1990s onwards, the fit is again very tight. It can be concluded that the
three-trends model emulates convergence in the developed part of the world
rather well. In this case, the "steady state" predictions overestimate the level











1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
observed fitted steady state
Figure 10: Observed and fitted global divergence
from the mid-1980s onwards. The countries in this group first converged more
than predicted by their "steady state" behaviour, then less. But again, the
"steady state" predictions are able to track the convergence trend in this group
relatively well, as they cover the largest part of the fall of the standard deviation
in the complete period.
Finally, the results for the non-"Europe and Western offshoots" group are
produced separately in Figure 12. This picture looks a lot like Figure 10, in-
dicating the large weight of this group in the global results. But the under-
estimation of heterogeneity is more severe for most of the period (except in the
1980s), indicating that the notion of "steady state" growth patterns is slightly
more problematic in this group of countries than in the sample as a whole. But
again, the general trend of divergence in this group is captured relatively well
even by just the "steady state" predictions.
4 Conclusions
Despite, or perhaps due to, globalization, the world economy has shown a broad
pattern of divergence of living standards since 1950. This paper has investi-
gated the nature of the factors that underlie this divergence trend. Specifically,
an econometric model was estimated that aims to describe growth performance
of nations in terms of so-called common trends. Each country’s growth path
(in terms of GDP per capita) is described as a function of a linear combina-
tion of three such common trends, plus an idiosyncratic country component.
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Figure 12: Observed and fitted divergence outside Europe and Western offshoots
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globalization, in which it is sometimes argued that, due to increased interaction
between countries, patterns of growth (both in the long run and in the shorter
business cycle domain) are more and more synchronized.
The empirical analysis that was conducted does not aim to identify any
causal mechanisms underlying economic growth. Instead, it is inherently de-
scriptive in nature, and aims to investigate whether the idea of common growth
trends has any relevance at all in describing the global empirical growth record
in the post-1950 period. The results show that a model with just three common
trends explains growth trends in a cross-country sample of 129 countries (largely
covering the globe) reasonably well. The individual country’s growth trends
that are fitted on the basis of these three trends provide a good description
of what happens at the country level, although a relatively small idiosyncratic
component of growth remains for all countries.
The nature of the three common trends provides with a useful, although per-
haps somewhat surprising, interpretation of the economic growth record. One
of the three trends takes the form of a smooth, "steady state"-like growth path,
with a more or less constant exponential growth rate of GDP per capita over the
complete period 1950-2006. The econometric model allows this "steady state"
to have a differential impact in each individual country, through the loading co-
efficients that link growth at the individual country level to the common trends.
It was shown that there are substantial differences between those loading coef-
ficients both between and within broad groups of countries that are defined on
geographical criteria. These differences imply that the countries in the sample
are characterized by different long-run growth rates. Thus, although they share
a "common" growth characteristic in terms of a more or less constant long-run
growth rate, this rate is highly country(-group) specific. This feature of the em-
pirical growth record was shown to be the major source of divergence of living
standards in the global economy.
The other two common trends are of a different nature: they show a non-
monotonic pattern, and hence are related to specific phases of high and low
growth that are shared between countries. Although these trends are important
for fitting the exact growth patterns at the country level, they were shown to be
relatively unimportant for explaining global divergence. Although the different
"steady state" growth patterns between countries under-estimate the level of
heterogeneity of living standards in the large sample for specific periods, they
do cover the general increase of this heterogeneity over time. Similarly, within a
smaller group of countries in Europe and the so-called Western offshoots (USA,
Canada, Australia and New Zealand), long-run "steady state" growth rates
have led to convergence, because these countries have experienced much more
homogenous growth rates.
The implications of this finding are possibly far-reaching. First, it seems that
specific episodes of rapid catch-up based growth, although obviously important
for individual countries, do not drive the global dynamics in income distribution.
The catching-up process that took place in a number of specific Asian countries
(the "Tigers", like South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) is embodied
in the 56-year long "steady state" growth rates of these countries, rather than
in a specific trend that unfolds itself in a more limited time frame. Differences
in growth performance that manifest themselves in such a long run, are truly
rooted in "deep" causal factors. Policies for growth are truly long-run in nature.
Second, with respect to globalization, it can be concluded that the empiri-
16
cal growth record suggests that a view of a single global growth trend is a too
simplistic description of reality. Countries do share common growth character-
istics, but this does not imply that they all converge to the same growth path.
Instead, the extent to which countries relate to common growth trends varies
significantly between them, leading to the long-run growth rate differentials that
were already discussed extensively. Such an empirical stylized fact is more con-
sistent with the view that different countries benefit to different extent from
globalization than a view in which one globalization size fits all. Also, to the
extent that post-WW2 globalization may comprise two distinct phases (Bretton
Woods and post-Bretton Woods), this does not show up in the empirical results
obtained here. Divergence of living standards is a phenomenon that takes place
over the entire time span, and there is no sign at all that the speed of diver-
gence slows down in the recent era of financial globalization. Thus, the notion
of international capital mobility leading to increased international spillovers and
thereby convergence of living standards is not supported by the results obtained
here. Over the entire post-1950 period, catching-up is a phenomenon that char-
acterizes some countries, but not the world as a whole, not even the world before
the recent economic turmoil.
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6 Appendix. Prediction error of the model with
varying number of trends
For every observation i, the prediction error ei was calculated as ei = yi − byi,
where the hat indicates a predicted value. For every year, the sum of e2i is
documented in the figures below, either for the complete sample ("global") or
for the country groups "Europe & Western offshoots" or "other". It is observed
that the average squared prediction error is smallest is Europe and Western
offshoots. For the model with 1 and 2 trends, the squared prediction error
observed in the other countries is reasonably large. For the model with 3 trends,
it is below 0.01 for most of the time. Thus, the model with 3 trends provides
a better fit, especially for the "other" group of countries. The model with 4
trends provides an even better overall fit, but this comes at the expense of a
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Figure 16: 4 Trends (M = 4)
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